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NATURAL LAW THEORY: ITS PAST AND ITS PRESENT
JOHN FINNIs*
The past in which theory of this kind had its origins is notably similar to
the present. For this is theory-practical theory-which articulates a
critique of critiques, and the critiques it criticizes, rejects and replaces have
much in common whether one looks at them in their fifth century B.C.
Hellenic (Sophistic) or their modem (Enlightenment, Nietzschean or
postmodern) forms.
I
In the name of nature or the natural (in some of the many dozens of
meanings of those terms), the thinkers whom natural law theory corrects
have scathingly criticized conventional conceptions of justice and injustice,
of (more generally) right and wrong, and (most generally) of good and bad
in human action, affairs and institutions. The conventional conceptions are
denounced, or more covertly subverted, as unjustifiable impositions on what
is natural: a life pursuing passionate satisfactions such as power, sex, and
other bodily and emotional interests (today often conceived as
psychological or "subconscious" drives or "complexes"). The Sophistic
conception of the natural is not nalve; it accommodates some main realities
of social existence: typically it counsels compliance with social norms
whenever one's detected violation of them would incur sanctions, or other
resistance that would frustrate one's pursuit of one's interests. And it
acknowledges that one's interests need not be individualistic; one may find
one's satisfactions in one's group's power and prestige, lorded ruthlessly
over other groups. The survival and predominance of the fittest, which is the
natural goal of existence, is naturally a social matter. It includes winning the
support or acquiescence of other members of the group by such stratagems
as professing the conventional belief in justice and morality, and making or
postulating agreements ("social contracts") to abstain from harming them,
to lend them reciprocal assistance, and so forth-agreements silently
* This article was presented at the IVR meeting in Franfurt am Main in August 2011,
and a version of it was published in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, ed.
Andrei Marmor (New York: Routledge, 2012), 16-30
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subordinated always to their purpose of advancing the natural priority of
one's own purposes and interests in survival, domination, pleasure, etc.
The critique of such theories and forms of life that was carried through
by Socrates and Plato ("the Platonic critique") included a purposeful
capturing or radical reshaping of the idea of nature, the natural and the
naturally fitting. The Platonic critique shares with the Sophists some
elements in their critique of the conventional and traditional. For although
people who respect traditional norms and standards of evaluating human
conduct may well regard these not merely as a social fact but as having
directive force for them, and thus a kind of moral truth, nonetheless this
attitude of theirs is often-indeed, characteristically-marked by its
uncritical marginalizing of the question of truth. For them, the fact that the
norms and standards are what they found respected in their society and
among their forebears counts in practice as if it were sufficient warrant. The
Platonic critique foregrounds the question of the truth or error, the moral
reasonableness or unreasonableness, of any and all normative propositions
(claims, norms) held out-whether in traditions, dialogue or personal
reflection (conscience)-as directive for individuals and groups. It insists on
the distinction basic also to the present article: that if there is a natural law
that, by reason of the true goodness to which it directs us, is entitled to
direct all consciences, it has no past, present or future; only beliefs and
theories about it have temporality and a history.'
A central text in this critique of the Sophists' critique is Plato's dialogue
Gorgias. Here Plato presents, in fictionalized parties to the discourse, a
spectrum of Sophistic positions, from the less (Gorgias) to the more radical
(Polus) and most thoroughgoing (Callicles). Socrates triumphs dialectically
over Callicles while the reader knows that, in real history, politically
unprincipled operatives of perhaps Calliclean type worked on a malleable
crowd of conventionally minded jurymen fired up about the state's
traditions to bring Socrates to his unjust condemnation and execution. The
Socratic thesis that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it2 is thus given a
tacit force and challenge even as Plato tests and vindicates it through a
probing discussion of what the criteria of "good" and "better" really are, in
reasonable judgment. So, for example, the Calliclean proposals to assimilate
the better to the stronger (entitling the strong to rule over the weak
regardless of other merits or deservings) is refuted by the consideration that
the weak collectively are stronger than the strong, and that a life spent in
1. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011; 1st ed., 1980), 24-25.
2. Gorgias 469b-c, 479c, 489b, 508d-e.
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avoiding this menace to the unscrupulous is a life of servitude to the
opinion, interests and whims of the crowd. So if the naturally superior
strength of the many entails (as Callicles would have it) that they and their
views are better, the Calliclean position breaks down, in a kind of self-
refutation:
Socrates: Don't the many [who collectively are stronger] have a rule that
says it's just to have an equal share, and a rule that doing what's unjust is
more shameful than suffering it?.. .So it isn't merely "as a matter of law"
that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering wrong, or that
justice is a matter of equal shares, but "by nature" too. So you seem to
have spoken falsely, earlier, when you challenged me with your claim that
nature and law [instituted by people] are opposites.
The demonstrations that the Calliclean position is incoherent are less
important, in the end, than the dialogue's more implicit disclosures of the
intelligible goods that are at stake in any dialogue worthy of the name.
Dialogue is real, and worth pursuing, only under conditions of knowledge,
goodwill and frank free speech among the participants. They, and any
audience, can find it worthwhile as a dialogue only if they value both truth
and the sharing in discovery and acknowledgement of truth by all
concerned. To value and secure this active sharing is a further intelligible
good, worthy of pursuit alongside the good of truth and knowledge. This
further good can be calledfriendship.
Each of these intelligible goods is the subject of a normative proposition
which naturally-or, more precisely, rationally-even if inexplicitly, comes
into play when one is reflecting or deliberating about one's opportunities,
and which directs us to be interested in the actualizing of this good and in
the avoiding of what negates it (such as ignorance or superstition, or hatred
and deception). This normativity or directiveness is not yet "moral," as
justice and injustice are. But it soon unfolds into the normativity of the
virtuous or vicious (the right and the wrong, if you prefer) because the
competition between various worthwhile opportunities (knowledge,
friendship, service of country, marriage, etc.), and between all or any of
these and opportunities for gratifying more or less subrational, emotional
desires and aversions, calls urgently for adjudication and control by some
further and, as controlling, higher principle or source of order in one's
deliberating, choosing and acting-in one soul, as Plato puts it. This is the
adjudication that only practical reasonableness (Plato's virtue of phronisis)
can make, and make actual in one's life and conduct. It is this virtue that
enables one to discern, practically, what is just and unjust, courageous and
3. Ibid., 488-9, with 483a-b.
832012
84 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE
cowardly and rash, and so forth. Its adjudications are, in the last analysis,
propositional, and the normativity of these propositions is moral. We have
arrived at a new conception of (moral) law, to transcend and replace the
directiveness attributed to subrational nature by the Sophists.
The last step in this conceptual reordering is the transfer of the predicate
"natural" to this moral "law." The transfer is justified for multiple, distinct
reasons. First, one's understanding that truth, friendship, human life itself
and the other such possible objects of choice are indeed good-not only as
means to other ends but intrinsically-is an understanding achieved readily,
non-inferentially and in that sense spontaneously, as an achievement of
one's intelligence when attentive to real possibilities and alternatives and
free from external distractions or dominantly passionate, subrational factors
in one's psychic makeup. It is in these senses a natural understanding, an
achievement of natural reason (to be carefully distinguished from data-free
intuition). It is available even to children, once they have had sufficient
experience of the world to be aware of real possibilities and their
alternatives.
Second, the intrinsic and thus basic intelligible goods are understood
precisely as pursuit-worthy. So this understanding is practical, concerned
not merely with what truly is, but also and essentially with what truly is-to-
be in a sense that is not predictive but directive, normative, articulable from
the outset in the language of normativity: should, ought, is-to-be-done.
Nonetheless, this practicality of one's understanding of human good in no
way entails that the objects of practical understanding and judgment are a
matter of invention or creation. Rather, the basic human goods are
discovered (as to-be-brought-into-existence). In this way, each basic good
stands over and against our understanding, and in this respect is like the
natural world of objects that are what they are, and have the natural order
they have and follow the natural laws they do, quite independently of
human thought, contrivance and action.
Third, life, knowledge, friendship and so forth are understood as basic
aspects of human flourishing or well-being or fulfillment, actualizable if
chosen intelligently and pursued and acted upon. They are understood as
good "for me" and anyone like me-and this "like me" soon becomes
intelligible securely as: any other being capable, at least radically, of self-
conscious flourishing or failure-any human being or person. As aspects of
such flourishing, these basic human goods give point, shape, meaning and
specific identity to human action. But such actions are always the
actualizing of human capacities (powers, potentialities), and capacities in
turn are given us by our makeup, our nature, prior to a!l choice or action of
our own. So: to understand the basic aspects of human flourishing is
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implicitly to understand basic outlines of human nature. Propositions
picking out and directing us to the basic human goods can thus be well
described as principles of natural normativity, natural rightness or
fittingness, and natural law.
Such natural law, though sharply and cleanly distinguishable from laws
of nature that govern entities and processes (including many aspects of
human reality) independently of any understanding or choices, is factually
(that is, ontologically: in the order of being) dependent upon natural reality
that we find, not make. But epistemologically (that is, in the order of
coming to know), the first principles of natural law are first principles of
practical reason and, as such, are not dependent upon a prior adequate
knowledge of human nature. Our understanding of them presupposes some
knowledge of the factually given structures of possibility, availability,
causality and realizability, but adds very significantly to that prior
knowledge. In so adding, it makes possible an adequate understanding of
human nature via understanding of the human flourishing made possible by
human openness to ways of acting and living that quite transcend the
given-possibilities such as courageous friendship, devotion to justice,
humane artistic creativity, holiness of life and so forth. In sum: the oughts of
the first practical principles (principles of natural right and law) are not
inferred from prior knowledge of the is of nature. Rather, our ought-
knowledge of them both presupposes some elements of, and very
significantly contributes other elements to, the eventual body of such is-
knowledge.
II
This account has got ahead of Plato's, and fallen behind it. It has fallen
behind by omitting, thus far, his critique of the tradition-bound states of
mind and culture which the Sophists themselves criticized and delegitimated
(even when conforming, by choice, to traditions and conventions). Plato's
critique of tradition is presented, explicitly, not so much in the Gorgias as in
his later, greater work, The Republic. And it is a critique not so much of
particular customs, perhaps more or less peculiar to one or more societies,
but rather of conventional wisdom. But what exactly is that? Plato identifies
the object of his critique by exemplifying it. Cephalus, representative of the
oldest living generation, the grandparents, defines justice as paying one's
debts and telling the truth, and loses interest in the matter when Socrates
points out that there are occasions when it is wrong to return what one has
borrowed (say, a weapon from a lender who has now gone mad), and wrong
2012 85
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to tell the truth (say, to a dangerous maniac).' Cephalus's son Polemarchus,
host of the whole occasion of the dialogue, is a little closer to the
sophistication of the Sophists. He holds that justice is a matter of benefiting
one's friends and harming one's enemies, or (under dialectical pressure
from Socrates) of benefiting just people and harming the unjust.5 Socrates
demonstrates that it is never just to (choose/try to) harm anyone, and
Polemarchus has to concede that what he learned about justice from
powerful political and financial leaders was unsound.6 The stage is cleared
for the intervention of the radical Sophist, here in the person of
Thrasymachus who, like Plato's Callicles, holds that:
injustice, if it is on a large enough scale [as in the tyrant's efficacious rule
over his community], is stronger, freer and more masterly than justice
[conventionally conceived] ... [J]ustice [truly conceived] is what is
advantageous to the stronger, while injustice [conventionally conceived] is
to one's own profit and advantage.
The rest of the dialogue, in effect, is Plato's response, his critique of the
Thrasymachean (and Calliclean) critique and rejection of the conventional
conceptions of injustice.
The Platonic critique takes it as obvious that the large elements of truth in
conventional wisdom about (say) giving people their due' must be
vindicated against the corrosive Sophistic critique, which sophistically
inverts and negates that truth; and obvious too that the vindication will have
to be critical and philosophically grounded in ways that conventional
wisdom has simply not inquired after or understood. In the terminology of
the eventual theory emergent in Plato: natural law and natural right must be
vindicated by the theoretical reflections, conceptualizations and arguments
that a textbook or companion to philosophy may label natural law theory.
Enough has been said in this sketch of some Platonic dialectic to indicate
that the conventional or traditional morality which Plato is concerned both
to criticize and to (partially) vindicate is not to be understood as merely
"positive morality" or "social morality" in the sense proposed by John
Austin and H. L. A. Hart. They (especially Hart) spoke as if such a morality
were held as positive, rather than as true. Plato, the more accurate
sociologist and philosopher, is clear that even those who hold to a partially
untrue morality, and do so without sufficient critical attention to its
4. Republic 331b-d.
5. Ibid., 334.
6. Ibid., 335d-336a.
7. Ibid., 334c.
8. Ibid., 335e.
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coherence or its warrant, nonetheless are very unlikely to hold and consider
it as simply a fact about their society's beliefs, and equally unlikely to
explain it to themselves as warranted precisely and simply because their
society or their elders have held them; almost certainly they will hold it
rather as a truth (as they suppose) about what is good and bad for people
and right and wrong in human action. The problem, as Plato rightly sees it,
is that their lack of critical interest in the grounds of their belief-the lack
that makes their belief conventional-leaves them (and the conventions)
exposed to distortion and error about the truth of, or error in, the belief's
moral content.
How is moral error detected and avoided? Implicitly, the answer given by
Plato and the whole philosophical tradition which he initiated (the tradition
represented by Aristotle and Aquinas) is something like this. A judgment-
the affirming or denying of a proposition-is erroneous when it does not
cohere with judgments which, even after critical questioning and the test of
dialogue and dialectic, one holds to be rationally justified and expects other
similarly critical and careful persons, similarly placed, would agree with. In
the case of judgments about realities that are what they are independently of
anyone's thinking about them, their justification is that they
conform/correspond to-fit, and are in line with-those realities; that they
so correspond is what is meant in calling them true. These realities, of
course, are only known in judgments, but the judgments are based on the
data of experience (evidence in all relevant forms), and are justified only on
condition that they do not overlook or neglect, but rather do rationally
account for, the data. In the case of judgments about human goods whose
realization is dependent on being conceived, considered desirable, opted for,
and pursued and achieved or instantiated by action carrying out such
choices, the justification of the judgments is again a matter (i) of coherence
with other judgments that one thinks all other people would, under ideal
epistemic conditions, agree with, and (ii) of correspondence with something
that stands over and against one's judgments as their object, something that
is affirmed when the judgment is true and misstated or denied when the
judgment is false. What is this something, in relation to judgments about
what is good and right in human action and achievement? There has been a
tendency in the tradition to respond: human nature. But that kind of
response overlooks the difference between realities that are what they are
affirmed to be, independently of our thought or affirmation (which can thus
be called "theoretical" or descriptive reason), and realities that it would be
good to achieve by rational choice and action (and as such are the primary
subject matter of practical reason). A better response is: practical reason's
judgments are true when they accurately anticipate-are in anticipatory
2012 87
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correspondence to-the human good that can be realized (call it fulfillment
or flourishing) by actions in accordance with them.'
As with theoretical/descriptive judgments, there is no vantage point
outside or prior to practical judgments for assessing this correspondence,
and the grandmasters of the natural law tradition did not suppose there was.
So the working criterion of truth is coherence with other practical
judgments, and capacity to be shared in judgment by other persons in
epistemically like cases. The judgments of the Sophists largely fail this test;
the Socratic showing of Callicles's self-refutation is only one instance. The
Thrasymachean judgments that justice-whether understood as the most
reasonable choice for me, or as the "natural order of things"-consists in the
rule of the stronger or more deceitfully cunning, and that it is reasonable
(because and when advantageous) to practice injustice, have their
plausibility only when envisaged as the judgments held and acted upon by a
few persons in a community which by and large adheres to the contrary
judgments: that promises should generally be kept and debts paid even
when a strong or ruthless debtor could get away with reneging on his debt;
that lies should not be told (even if false propositions can be defensively
articulated to unjust aggressors); that distributions should follow principles
of fairness using criteria such as need, desert, function or (by default)
equality rather than imperiousness of demand or forcible seizure of the
common stock by the strongest or greediest; that one should do to others
only what one would be willing to have them do to oneself; and so forth.
Similarly, the judgment or thesis that practical reason should look only to
the future advantage promised by the present choice (whether of the
reasoner or of everybody) shows itself false by its incoherence with any
reliance on the promised cooperation of others, and with the reasonableness
of them contributing (say as one's employees) to one's well-being or other
interests in reliance on one's promise. And so forth.
In each case, the Platonic critique lends support to moral positions more
or less traditional in his day as in ours. In each case, the critique lends
rational support to the positions in several ways. It shows that the counter-
positions of the enlightened Sophists tend directly towards a disintegration
of social well-being insofar as it depends on taking into account (i) the
intelligible relations of present and future to the past (of promises, reliances,
undertakings, gifts and gratitude, merit, desert, responsibility of parent for
9. Germain Grisez, Joseph M. Boyle, and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral
Truth, and Ultimate Ends," American Journal ofJurisprudence 32 (1987): 99-151; and John
Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998), 99-101.
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child . . .), (ii) the rational requirement that a judgment of self-interest be
subjected to a test of compatibility with others' similar judgments
(universalizability, the Golden Rule .. .), (iii) the human goods that depend
upon friendly social cooperation extended stably though creatively through
time (goods such as science and learning, trust, political compromise and
moderation, a rule of law and not of the whims and prejudices of the
powerful .. .) and so forth.
It is the intelligible attractiveness of such goods that is the deep source of
the critique, and equally of the normativity of the propositions about right
and wrong that the critique shows to be warranted and truly worthy of
affirmation as the grounded anticipations of human fulfillment and thus as
true. The art of the dialogues is the displaying of the sheer desirability of
these goods, despite the sometimes demanding character of their
preconditions. Such desirability is in line with subrational, animal desires or
inclinations, but is much more a matter of intelligibility, that is, of a worth
that only reason understands. Against the self-refuting Calliclean blunder,
resumed later by Hume, of supposing that practical reason can only be the
slave (ingenious servant) of the passions, Plato already shows that a
"practical reason" which has no reasons for its proposing of means is not
worth calling reason, and that there are indeed intrinsically, intelligently
desirable human ends available to give true reason(s) for selection and
adoption.
The intelligible beauty, the fineness, worth and excellence of the goods
discernible by reason includes the sense of good implicit in the better of the
Socratic "better-more choiceworthy, less shameful-to suffer injustice
than to do it" exemplified historically by Socrates, willing (quite without
publicity of any kind) to decline participation in an unjust execution,o and
unwilling" to escape from prison and unjust execution by an act which he
judged, for considered reasons (even though we now can judge them less
than fully sufficient), to be subversive of his own society and its law, and of
proper gratitude. 2
III
What, then, of the ways in which the foregoing account has got ahead of
Plato? After all, his works foretell, at least implicitly, most if not all of the
10. See Plato Apology 32c-e.
11. See Plato Crito.
12. See Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
1983), 112-20; and Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 47-55.
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arguments revived or proposed in the Enlightenment that is well under way
with Machiavelli and Hobbes, darkens into the chiaroscuro of Benthamite
utilitarianism, and after the failed Kantian and post-Kantian resistance
reaches full darkness in the overt irrationalities enunciated, verbosely, by
Nietzsche and his pragmatist and postmodern epigones. The main
anachronisms in our rendering of the Platonic critique are (i) our use of the
term "moral(ity)" and (ii) our talk of principles and thus of law rather than
right and justice. The two are interrelated. In modern times, morality is
thought of as a code (set of rules or standards) of conduct, a code subscribed
to or acknowledged by members of a community. And "moral" is
understood, accordingly, as a predicate whose proper application is settled
by the norms of that or some such code. But even in the work of Aquinas, a
pivotal figure in the transition from the ancient to the modern world,
"moral" means: pertaining to human conduct as a matter of choice rather
than as determined by nature. Moral knowledge or instruction is,
accordingly, knowledge of or instruction about the factors that make choices
reasonable or unreasonable, good or bad. Of course, the criteria of
reasonableness and goodness can and must be able to be stated
propositionally, and can thus be articulated in lawlike form-that is, as
universal propositions directive of choice and action. And therefore there
are strong links and even overlaps between the ancient or medieval usage
and the modern. But modern morality-talk's focus on rules or norms of
lawlike form, rather than on the goods that give actions their intelligible
objects and thus their appropriate description(s), has some real
disadvantages. The modem term "morality" is deeply ambiguous,13 above
all between a "descriptive" sense in which what is decisive is that the code
is subscribed to or acknowledged by some concrete historical community,
and a "normative" or "internal" sense in which what is decisive is that the
standards referred to are taken to be true and authoritative guides to the
predication of virtue or vice, goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness in
some (class of) human choices and actions. Discussion, for example, of
inclusive legal positivism is hampered if not altogether frustrated by
uncertainty about whether what is under discussion as "the relation between
law and morality" is a relationship between two sets of standards cognizable
as such because held by some community or one or more of its judges, or
rather a relationship between (on the one hand) a set of (legal) standards so
13. Bernard Gert, "The Definition of Morality," The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy
(Fall 2012 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum201 1/entries/
morality-definition.
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held and (on the other hand) some truths about right and wrong in human
choosing and acting.
In any event, what interests Plato in criticizing and transcending the
Sophistic is the truth about justice and injustice, and good and bad or
superior and inferior in human action. Dispositions to act well, in a humanly
superior way, are virtues, and dispositions to act badly, in an inferior way,
are vices. The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the relevant kinds of
action is what makes them virtuous or vicious. He does not speak, in his
own voice, of "natural law," but rather of what is naturally (physei; or kata
physin) superior, reasonable, virtuous, truly choice-worthy.
Still, we are entitled to translate the argumentation and position-taking of
Plato into propositions justified, implicitly, by higher or deeper justifying
principles, picking out and directing us all towards goods, and higher and
highest goods, and supplying us with criteria of reasonableness in choice
and action. And we are entitled to go further. We can distinguish between a
first level of principles which pick out and direct us all towards goods such
as truth (or knowledge) and life, and a second level of principles. Principles
on this second level mediate, so to speak, among the first-level directives,
enabling us to discern between reasonable and unreasonable ways of
following those first-level directives, calling the reasonable ways just (or
rationally tempered) and right and the unreasonable unjust (or cowardly or
lust-driven) and wrong. First-level principles can be called (as Aquinas calls
them) first principles of natural law, and second-level principles can be
called standards or precepts of natural moral law.
Albeit without this terminology, Plato's critique concerns itself with both
kinds of principle. We have noticed, in passing, his concern to display the
intrinsic goodness of truth (knowledge), and of friendship (including the
fellow-feeling of citizens, political friendship). In his critique of sexual
immoralities such as fornication, masturbation and same-sex sex acts, the
search for an underlying principle leads him to identify, almost explicitly, a
further basic human good: marriage (the committed union of man and
woman in a procreative or would-be procreative friendship).14 A state law
restricting sex acts to marriage is, he affirms, a matter of true reason" and is
kata physin, natural"--and this "natural" is not a matter of the nature we
share with other animals but rather of reaching standards higher than the
animals: reasonableness (logos)."
14. See Plato Laws 838e-840e, where Plato's spokesman also speaks of the abuse he
expects to get for advancing these arguments and expressing these judgments.
15. Ibid., 835e, 836e.
16. Ibid., 839a.
17. Ibid., 840e.
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No doubt Plato is going too fast in proposing that this standard of
practical judgment be also enforced as a coercive state law. But the focus of
his thought is on what reasonableness requires of us as individuals, couples
and so forth, in our free deliberations and reflections. And his rigorous
assimilating of the humanly natural to the reasonable, and his clear
indication that, in the last analysis, an action's reasonableness is the ground
for calling it natural (not vice versa), are an important phase in the
development of the theory we now call natural law theory. The
argumentation's conclusion is propositional, law-like; its premises must be,
too. But the force of the argument, the principles and the conclusions,
comes from the goods to which the premises of principle refer, and more
precisely from their attractiveness to practical understanding, as goods that
we need to have as objects of our actions if we are to be fully intelligent and
fully masters of our subrational inclinations just insofar as these work to
distract us from such full reasonableness rather than (as they do when our
psyche is in good order) supporting and giving fully human weight to our
reasonable judgments.
The rendering of ethics (synonymously, morality) and of natural law
theory's primary account-an ethics of political society and law-into the
form of lawlike propositions (principles, norms) is accomplished gradually
over the millennium and a half after Plato. Important currents in this are
Aristotle's Ethics and Politics and Rhetoric; the Stoics; the Roman
publicists and jurists (tightly linking law, right, rights and justice); the
Pauline New Testament (pronouncing the revealed moral commandments of
the Decalogue to be also and equally requirements of humanity's nature and
of sound conscience); 9 Augustine of Hippo's Platonizing speculations on
the directive ideas in the supreme creative intelligence creator and on "the
eternal law" of that creator's ongoing providential ordering and sustaining
of every creature; and Thomas Aquinas's synthesis of the whole tradition
(despite the unavailability to him of all but a tiny fragment of Plato's
works), a synthesis that for the first time penetrates fully to principles and at
the same time builds up and builds in a distinct and carefully elaborated
theory of human, positive law.
18. V. Bradley Lewis, "'Reason Striving to Become Law': Nature and Law in Plato's
Laws," American Journal of Jurisprudence 54 (2009): 79, citing Laws 64 2a, 689b, 690c,
720d, 728d, 733a, 875d, 943a, 966b.
19. Romans 2: 14-16.
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IV
About a century before Plato, the greatest of the pre-Sophistic Greek
philosophers, Heraclitus of Ephesus, articulates-albeit without the word
"natural" or its cognates, and with a reference to the divine-the heart of the
tradition of natural law theory:
Those who speak with intelligence (xyn no6) must hold fast to [or:
strengthen themselves with] what is common (xyn6) to all, as the political
community does with the law (nom6), and more strongly so. For all human
laws (anthr6peioi nomoi) nourish themselves from the one divine (law),
which Fovems as far as it will and suffices (and more than suffices) for all
things.
Much of Plato's treatment of these matters can be taken as a vast expansion,
defense and explication of this. And Plato's greatest pupil makes his
clearest statement of the theory, in the unpropitious context of his Rhetoric,
with a similar appeal to what is common because entitled by its
reasonableness and thus its naturalness to be adopted in and by any
community:
Justices and injustices, then, have been defined in relation to two kinds of
law ... : I mean, law which is distinctive (idion), and law which is
common [to everyone] (koinon). Distinctive law is that which a particular
group sets down for its own members (it is partly written down, and partly
unwritten); law which is common to everyone is that which accords with
nature. For there really is, as everyone senses, something just by nature
and common to all-and something unjust-even when people have no
association or agreement with one another. This for example is what
Sophocles's Antigone is plainly referring to, when she says that the burial
of Polyneices, although prohibited, is just, meaning that it is just by nature:
"Not belongini to today or tomorrow, /It lives eternally: no one knows
how it arose.'
Sixteen-hundred years later, Aquinas will start to popularize the term
"positive law" for what Aristotle had called law distinctive or particular to a
particular political group, and will decisively supersede Aristotle's
distracting concern with the relatively superficial distinction between
written and unwritten, replacing it with a categorization of positive law
20. Diels-Kranz, fragment B 114; the wordplay serves, not leads, the thought, which can
be taken with fragment B44: "The people should fight for the law [nomos] as if for their city-
wall." Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Zilrich:
Weidmann, 1985).
21. Aristotle Rhetoric 1373b2-15. (Translation by Michael Pakaluk: http://www.nlnrac.org/
classical/aristotle/primary-source-documents.) See also the similar but more difficult passage in
his Nicomachean Ethics 1134bl8-1135a5.
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according to its two modes of derivation from principles that are common to
every people precisely because they are reasonable and therefore
"natural."22 Where the derivation is by logical specification (as killing or
wounding are distinct specifications of harming), that part of the state's
positive law can be called natural law or jus gentium (law common to all
peoples). Where the derivation involves not only rational connection but
also a choice between reasonable alternatives, the process of specification is
not so much logical as legislative or at least partly creative and optional;
Aquinas labels it determinatio and indicates that this part of the state's
positive law is "positive" in a strict sense - but for its positing by some
lawmaker (legislative or judicial), it would have no claim to be part of the
state's law. Where such a determinatio (strictly: a rule made by such a
determinatio) is just in its content and procedure, it is morally binding (on
members of the community to which it applies) even though it is not "part
of morality" but rather is purely positive law and could reasonably have
been different in many, many details.
It is of first importance to understand this fully achieved thesis of natural
law theory with precision. Any proper example (central case) of legal
systems will be positive law in its entirety and all its parts, and at the same
time will comprise two elements, (i) a set of rules, principles and
institutions which are natural and are, or ought to be, common to all other
legal systems, and (ii) a set, doubtless much larger, of rules, principles and
institutions which are purely positive, and more or less distinctive of this
particular political community and legal system. The relationship of natural
law to the positive law of a particular state (or of the international order) is
thus not best thought of as a coexisting of two normative orders. Rather it is
a matter of acknowledging (or denying) the validity and legitimacy (not
independent of sufficient efficacy and widespread acknowledgement) of
that positive law/legal system, while at the same acknowledging the
normative principles which are necessary (though by far not sufficient) to
the validating and legitimating of that law and are capable of invalidating or
delegitimating it.
The preceding sentence refers to both validity and legitimacy because
"validity" (and to some extent also "legitimacy") is here ambiguous. Partly,
the source of the ambiguity is the permanent tension whereby natural moral
law (morality; moral truth about justice. . .) can serve both to make positive
law morally binding and to deprive it of moral obligatoriness. But partly,
the ambiguity's source is that a main reason for wanting to introduce
22. See Finnis, "The Truth in Legal Positivism," in Philosophy ofLaw, Collected Essays
Vol. IV(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 174-88.
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positive law and the Rule of Law is to resolve disputes within a political
community about what justice and the rest of morality requires or
authorizes. There is thus good reason to introduce a way of thinking-call it
legal or juristic thinking-within which (within undefined but important
limits) the sheer fact that a legally ("constitutionally") authorized person or
body of persons has pronounced its determinatio of some disputed or
disputable issue is taken as sufficient ground for affirming the legal validity
of the determinatio and its propositional product (rule, judgment, etc.). In
this way of thinking, issues of the justice or injustice of the determinatio are
pushed to the margins of the legal domain (though they retain within that
domain a kind of underground existence in the form ofjuristic principles or
presumptions of interpretation). Only when the moral limits are approached
do questions of justice and morality become once again overtly relevant.
Thus talk of "validity" can be more or less fully and cleanly reserved to
intra-systemic legal (positive-law) discourse, and taken to entail not moral
but legal obligatoriness (an obligatoriness not to be reduced to liability to
penalty or punishment). In such a discourse context, one may choose to use
"legitimacy" to signify moral relevance, grounding moral obligatoriness.
But "legitimacy" too is not free from ambiguity, since some writers in
contemporary legal theory seem to treat it, perhaps, as synonymous with
(purely legal) validity.
Natural law theory has no quarrel with-indeed, promotes-a bifurcation
between intra-systemic [legal] validity (and obligatoriness) and legal
validity (and obligatoriness) in the moral sense.23 Indeed, it is not
unreasonable to see such a distinction at work in the famous tag "An unjust
law is not a law." This is mere self-contradiction and nonsense unless
"unjust law" here refers to an intra-systemically valid legal rule or order,
and "not law" signifies that, moral limits having been transgressed, this
same law lacks validity in the moral sense (i.e., legitimacy) and thus, at least
presumptively, lacks moral obligatoriness. (Of course, the speaker could
alternatively be intending to predicate injustice of certain beliefs and
practices-observable as social facts of acknowledgement of certain acts
and facts as laws-while not intending to assess legal validity even in a
technically and constrained and amoral sense.) That said, it is unfortunately
necessary to remark that there is nothing even prima facie self-
contradictory, nonsensical or paradoxical about the tag. For the idiom is
widespread and quite unremarkable: "an insincere friend is not a friend"; "a
logically invalid argument is no argument"; "a quack medicine is no
medicine"; and so forth.
23. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 314-20.
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Shifts of meaning of this kind were studied closely by Aristotle in
connection with his accounts of the kinds of equivocation or homonymy,
and of what we would now call analogous predication. A word can be said
to be analogical when its meaning shifts more or less systematically
according to context. The kind of analogy most relevant in the context of
human affairs is what Aristotle called pros hen homonymy. This is where
the various relevant meanings of a word are all relatable to a focal meaning
or sense or use, a meaning which picks out a primary or central case of the
kind of reality or subject matter under consideration-focal and central in
some context of discourse or inquiry. The non-focal senses and non-central
cases can be thought of as secondary because they are immature or deviant
or in some other way watered-down instances or kinds of the reality, at least
when regarded from some appropriate viewpoint or for some appropriate
theoretical or practical purpose.
One relevant purpose, theoretical but strongly related to the practical, is
that of developing an accurate account of human affairs as they have
unfolded and are likely to unfold in the existence of manifold human
societies of many times and places. Such an account would be highly
interesting in its own right, as a matter for contemplation detached from any
(other) practical purpose of the reader; but it would also be of practical
relevance as a source of accurate information about cause and effect in
human affairs. (For all practical reasoning towards choice and action
includes, besides its evaluative/normative premise(s), one or more premises
about what means are likely to achieve the desired end(s), what are the
preconditions for such means, and what the effects and side effects of such
means are likely to be.) Aristotle pressed on from achievements of his
empirical biological and other natural sciences into the study of human
political affairs, his Politics; decisive for its method was his decision to
select and employ its key terms or concepts by reference to practical
reasonableness, human flourishing and the virtues that are both constitutive
of and means to human flourishing. Forms of political association and
action that embody and favor such virtues are central, and the terms that
pick out such central forms are therefore employed in their focal sense-
focal at least for the purposes of political science. Other forms of political
life, however common and "typical," will then be understood as non-central
cases, immature or deviant (parekbaseis), and will be "polities,"
"constitutions," "citizenship," "political friendship," "laws," etc., in
secondary rather than focal senses of those terms. It is in this scholarly
context, resumed in late-thirteenth-century Aristotelianizing political
science, that Aquinas will take up the old tag about unjust laws not being
laws: they are, he prefers to say, not laws simpliciter, i.e., without
Vol. 57
JOHN FINNIS
qualification, but rather are laws in a corrupt form ("corrupt form" being his
Latinizing of parekbasis).
Aristotle's theoretical program was taken up again, in effect if not in
intention, by Max Weber in the early twentieth century. On the basis of
vastly more extensive historical information, Weber undertook to give an
account of human affairs going wider than his title Economy and Society
(1922).24 He announced it as value free, purely descriptive-explanatory. But
values were involved not only (as he recognized) in his decision to interest
himself in all this, but also (as he did not fully acknowledge to himself) in
his selection of concepts to provide the explanatory ordering of his whole
account and each of its parts. Thus the concepts with which he gives an
account of forms of governance are explicitly constructed in terms of
greater and less rationality. And though his official concept of rationality
was quasi-Humeian-the rationality of suitable means to subrationally
desired ends-he could not prevent his account from manifesting a more
adequate conception of rationality, in which human ends or purposes, too,
are ranked for their reasonableness, their coherence with human goods and
the flourishing both of individuals and of societies with their institutions.
V
The slow process of recovery of political and legal theory from the
devastating crudities and impoverishments of Enlightenment social
theorizing accelerated somewhat in the later twentieth century. In legal
theory, the process was notably advanced by H. L. A. Hart. His project of
understanding law, legal concepts and legal systems from "the internal point
of view" was, at least implicitly, a return to the perspective of the
political/legal theory that Aristotle put together by developing and
redeploying the strategies and elements of Plato's philosophy. For the
internal point of view that Hart took as his point of reference is the thinking
of persons (citizens, judges or other officials) who in a given political
community (or potential community) are in search or (as they suppose)
possession of reasons for some specific kinds of individual and social
choice: the social choice to develop and maintain rules restricting violence,
theft and fraud, and individual choices to acknowledge, adhere to and
support these rules; the social choice to remedy the defects of such rules by
introducing new forms of rule authorizing and regulating the changing and
the judicial application of social (now sufficiently articulated to be worthy
of the name legal) rules, and individual choices to recognize them in word
24. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press Inc., 1968).
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and deed. This is legal theory done for descriptive/explanatory, rather than
justificatory, purposes. But the explanations give the theoretical satisfaction
they do precisely by tracking the route that those who accepted the rules as
standards for their own and others' conduct do, or reasonably would, follow
in order to justify such acceptance to themselves and others. A natural law
theory of law follows the same route with an explicitly justificatory
purpose. It can do so without loss of descriptive/explanatory coverage or
content because it commands the conceptual technique of reference to
central and then to secondary cases, employing focal and qualified senses of
the terms and concepts it deploys.
Hart thought of his theory, expounded in The Concept of Law, as
identifying a "minimum content" of positive law, a content he called natural
law. But the content he officially included in this minimum was too minimal
even to track faithfully the course he had followed in identifying the case
for adding secondary to primary rules to yield a legal system. The human
goods at stake in these "remedies" for "defects" went beyond the one
human good he allowed into his official account: survival. Rather, the
defects concerned conditions for living together relatively well, responsively
to changing circumstances and opportunities and to the demands of
efficiency and fairness in resolving disputes about the content and
applicability of society's rules. Hart's resiling from acknowledgement of his
own theoretical method and achievement went even further in his
posthumous "Postscript," when he said:
Like other forms of positivism my theory makes no claim to identify the
point or purpose of law and legal practices as such. . . . In fact, I think it
quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which law as such serves
beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of
such conduct. This will not of course serve to distinguish laws from other
rules or principles with the same general aims; the distinctive features of
law are the provision it makes for secondary rules for the modification,
change, and enforcement of its standards and the general claim it makes to
priority over other standards.25
That statement is unfaithful to his book itself, which insistently specified the
"general aims" of social regulation as aiding survival by restricting
violence, fraud, etc., and made its signature contribution to legal theory by
specifying the aims of secondary, law-introducing rules in ways that make
intelligible and potentially reasonable the claim of the new set of rules to be
now a system and to give reason, in "priority over other standards," for the
25. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; 1st ed.,
1961), 248-49.
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allegiance of its officials and, in nonpathological cases, of all save criminal
citizens. What, then, motivated Hart's recoil from his own method and its
achievement? The only plausible answer seems to be that, in face of the
questions debated between Plato and the Sophists, his own answers favored
the Sophists' denial of moral truth. He thought legal theory could be
pursued without confronting or taking a stand on those questions; even the
discussions of morality in The Concept of Law are framed by him as
"seek[ing] to evade these philosophical difficulties" about whether moral
principles, so-called, can be anything other than mere "expressions of
changing human attitudes, choices, demands, or feelings," in no way matter
for discovery (or misidentification) by exercise of reason attaining (or
missing) knowledge.26 But this programmatic agnosticism about good and
evil and right and wrong is transgressed, albeit cautiously and with
unwarranted restrictions, throughout the legal theory he developed. The
transgressions, which give the theory all its substance and worth, are
sometimes almost explicit, as when he celebrates the emergence of private
powers (and power-conferring rules) as a "step forward as important to
society as the invention of the wheel," 27 or vindicates the rectificatory
28justice of compensation for tortious/delictual injuries,2 or treats as decisive
for legal theory's selection of concepts the need for clear-sighted
confrontation of, and readiness to disobey, "the official abuse of power,, 29
or says and repeats that judges "must not" exercise their lawmaking powers
arbitrarily but rather "must act as a conscientious legislator would," 30 that is,
"relying on his sense of what is best."3
Hart's characterization of his work as "positivism" gets its meaning from
the implicit contrast: positivism rejects "natural law theory." But the
contrast, like the rejection, is a blunder. There is indeed a worthwhile
theoretical issue at stake, but it is the one at stake between Plato and
Callicles or Thrasymachus or, in real life, Antiphon32 : between acceptance
and denial that there is knowledge of human good and evil and right and
wrong. Beyond that, there is really nothing strategic in dispute. A modem
natural law theory of law builds on Aquinas's account of positive law, itself
a systematization and terminological refinement of the elements in
26. Ibid., 168; also 186, 206.
27. Ibid., 42.
28. Ibid., 164-65.
29. Ibid., 210.
30. Ibid., 273.
31. Ibid., 275.
32. See Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Volume II: The World of the Polis (Baton
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 312-19.
2012 99
100 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE
Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle and the Roman jurists around the turn of the
eras. It incorporates without the least strain anything upon which self-styled
positivist accounts of positive law may have shed light, for example the
conceptual structure of bilateral, three-term rights, the interrelationships
between power, authority and validity, or the legal identity and personality
of corporations. It distinguishes intra-systemic from morally predicated
legal validity and correlative senses of obligatoriness. A modem natural law
theory steadily repudiates all confusion, such as pervades positivist works,
between Is and Ought, for (like Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, in their basic
theorizing) it permits normative predicates only when grounded in, or
articulating, principles which are normative all the way to the bottom
(where intelligence understands and is directed by goods whose worth is
self-evident to anyone with sufficient information about or experience of
what is possible). Its account of authority builds in the achievements of
game theory and other theories of rational choice, without their arbitrary
assumptions about the sufficiency of "self-interest" and the
commensurability of all goods and transitivity of all preferences. And
modem natural law theory is the proper context for reflection and
deliberation about human rights, and about the appropriate reach of global
as opposed to national or state sovereignty, territorial dominion and law (a
question to be approached through the grounds identified by natural law
theory for instituting property rights over resources originally common to,
and for the benefit of, all human persons).
In modem natural law theory, law (in its central cases) is a modality of
authority, available in specifically political communities, a modality
responsive in its form to the "procedural" values and justice that (as Fuller
showed in illustrating and systematizing scattered observations of
Aquinas33) are involved in the Rule of Law, a form of governance which
Plato and Aristotle contrasted and, in all but the most exceptional
circumstances, preferred to the legally unrestrained rule of a ruler. Its
account of deviant forms-abuses-of law is as rich as any positivist's, and
richer because its critical understanding of them is unrestrained by fears of
over-stepping the bounds of "positivism." For those bounds cannot in the
last analysis be other than freely contestable decisions by particular theorists
or schools of theorists who have not fully recovered from the
Enlightenment's peculiar mixture of unwarranted skepticism with
unwarrantable reliance on the models and methods employed in the
successful natural sciences-descriptive/explanatory sciences whose subject
33. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1969; Ist ed., 1964), 242.
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matter is the nature that is what it is regardless of our free choices and thus
is radically other than a nature that flourishes only in forms conceived by
practical reason and made actual only in and by the free choices which not
only shape the course of events but also build up human character as just or
unjust, vicious or virtuous. What can be said of human character can be said
also of the legal systems that people choose to constitute and maintain in
and for their communities.
There is every reason to hope, and some reason to expect, that that
recovery will continue and that the future of the philosophy of law will be
mainly as a recognizably (even when unlabeled) natural law theory of
positive law.

